The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role of technology in moral revolutions, understood as processes of radical group-level moral change, amounts to. We do (...) so by investigating four historical episodes of radical moral change in which technology plays a noteworthy role. Our case-studies illustrate the plurality of mechanisms involved in technomoral revolutions, but also suggest general patterns of technomoral change, such as technology’s capacity to stabilize and destabilize moral systems, and to make morally salient phenomena visible or invisible. We find several leads to expand and refine conceptual tools for analysing moral change, specifically by crystallizing the notions of ‘technomoral niche construction’ and ‘moral payoff mechanisms’. Coming to terms with the role of technology in radical moral change, we argue, enriches our understanding of moral revolutions, and alerts us to the depths of which technology can change our societies in wanted and unwanted ways. (shrink)

Hermann J. Cloeren - Otto Friedrich Gruppe 1804-1876: Philosoph, Dichter, Philologe - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 367-369 Ludwig Bernays, editor. Otto Friedrich Gruppe 1804–1876: Philosoph, Dichter, Philologe. Freiburg: Rombach, 2004. Pp 279. Paper, € 39,90. Two hundred years after his birth, Otto Friedrich Gruppe is commemorated in essays by American and European scholars. Contributions in English, French, German, and Italian treat diverse aspects of Gruppe's life and work. While Gruppe's (...) son, Otto Gruppe, in his time a well-known philologist, considered his father's best work to be his poetry, O. F. Gruppe's great-grandson, Dr. Ludwig Bernays, the editor of this volume, wisely chose a more encompassing approach. The present review considers contributions dealing with Gruppe's philosophical writings. The essays dealing with Gruppe as a poet, journalist, philologist, and secretary of the Königliche Akademie der Künste have to be considered elsewhere... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Marja Heimonen, “Justifying the Right to Music Education”Hermann J. KaiserFirst of all I would like to thank Marja Heimonen for her paper on a central problem not only for music education as practice but also for the theory of music education. She gives a very clear and convincing answer to a permanently irritating question: How do we justify music education within an ensemble of competing (...) subjects struggling to get a place within the school curriculum. And she does it in a rather uncommon way, that is, by means of legal philosophy. I think her arguments provoke several questions worthy of serious discussion. Some of these questions I shall try to indicate.The first question relates to the right to (music) education. Referring to the Nordic countries she states, "Their legal systems are based on enacted acts and statutes not only protecting the citizens against criminal acts but also securing their rights to receive a certain amount and standard of services the state is obliged to provide" and she continues: "Education is one of the basic rights in Nordic societies." I am interested very much in the wording by which these constitutions declare the right to education respectively to music education. The German constitution, for example, says only, but very bluntly that the entire schooling system stands under control of the state. That means, in connection with compulsory schooling, education at school means no right but a compulsion. (I shall come back to this point later.)The second question relates to the issue of internal versus external goods or instrumental versus self-justifying aims. In her attempt to justify music education Heimonen makes a distinction between internal and external goods, instrumental and self-justifying aims. I wonder if this distinction—though it is very common in theories of action and of value—really refers to different facts; perhaps [End Page 213] it is only a difference in perspectives. I will transform this problem into a question thus: Are aims and values emphasizing a person's well-being really not instrumental with regard to this person? The well-being aims look to me to be necessarily connected to self-justifying aims. Aims, values, activities, facts, situations, and so on, generating well-being, are always instrumental with regard to a person's well-being. What else should they be?On the other hand, are so-called external goods and instrumental aims not self-justifying aims as well, again from the point of view of the person concerned? Are not aims which favor the training of a future professional (so called instrumental aims) self-justifying with regard to this person since they contribute very much to his or her well-being? Thus music educators should not hesitate to demonstrate the real individual, social, economical, and so on, benefit of music education to the society concerned very energetically.The third question arises around the implicit theories of the teacher, the school, and the function of music education as set forth by Heimonen in her paper. Heimonen compares the structure of the (music) teacher's situation with that of a judge. She says:The judge has to operate between the tensions of different interests in the framework of the law consisting of written regulations and the tradition of previous cases that have been solved.... The judge works within a "legal puzzle" just as the music teacher operates in a "musical puzzle": both of them have to think holistically as they try to achieve the best possible solutions in a particular situation, and both of them have to act innovatively and creatively in their practice.Here the question arises as to whether the "musical puzzle" is really the corresponding moment to the "legal puzzle" or whether it is the "music-pedagogical puzzle." I think it is the latter. But the teacher does not have—like the judge "his" legal system—a framework of written regulations and he never is in the situation just to apply rules on different cases. That is to say, one cannot reduce educational activities to making decisions on the basis of right or wrong, good or bad. But even if one would acknowledge an identical structure of the... (shrink)

Objective: While behavioral recommendations regarding physical activity commonly focus on reaching demanding goals by proposing ‘thresholds’, little attention has been paid to the question of how much of a behavioral change is needed to make people feel that they have changed. The present research investigated this relation between actual and felt behavior change. Design: Using data from two longitudinal community samples, Study 1 and 2 comprised 614 (63 % women) and 398 participants (61 % women) with a mean age of (...) 40.9 years (SD = 13.6) and 42.5 years (SD = 13.4), respectively. Using a stage-approach, participants were classified into four groups by asking them at the respective second measurement to indicate whether they had become more physically active since their last participation six months ago (“Changers”), had tried but did not succeed in becoming more physically active (“Attempters”), were already physically active on a regular basis (“Regular Actives”), or had not tried to become more physically active (“Non-Attempters”). Physical activity was measured using the International Physical Activity Questionnaire (IPAQ), and fitness level was assessed as physical working capacity (PWC) via bicycle ergometry. Mixed ANOVAs including Time and Perceived Change as within and between factors were conducted, followed up by simple effect analyses. Results: Participants stating to have become more active in the past six months (Changers) showed a significant increase in vigorous physical activity but not in moderate physical activity, with an average of 6.8 (Study 1) and 10.6 (Study 2) MET-h per week in vigorous activity. Corroborating these findings, objective fitness also significantly increased in the group of Changers. No systematic change in moderate or vigorous physical activity was observed for the three other ‘non-changer’ groups (regular actives, attempters, non-attempters). Conclusion: The intensity of physical activity is the crucial variable for people’s perception of change in physical activity. Moderate physical activity seems not to be perceived as an effective means for behavior change. It thus might fail to unfold sufficient motivational impact, despite its known positive effects on health. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to David Carr, “The Significance of Music for the Promotion of Moral and Spiritual Value”Iris M. YobDavid Carr has addressed a question that has been lurking in philosophical literature for centuries and, I might add, in our collective intuition as well: Just what is the connection between music and the moral and spiritual life? And as we have come to expect from his work, he brings a (...) new perspective to this perennial question in his answer. First he traces a line of thinking since Plato about music and the ordering of the soul, he touches on the role of music and the other arts in exploring the complexities of the moral imperative as it is lived out in human lives, and returns at the end to give a new take on the old Platonic idea of ordering of the soul. Just maybe, he suggests, the detachment, however temporary, "from the trials and tribulations that beset us in the day to day rough and tumble of human practical affairs" "in the interests of some more balanced perspective" on spiritual and moral matters "might be easier to achieve in the contemplation and appreciation of great works of 'music alone.'"This conclusion does not lay claim to more than what is perfectly reasonable. Allowing oneself to be immersed in a great work of music or art or architecture or dance may very well provide that distance from every day life where one might [End Page 209] re-center and refocus, refresh and renew one's outlook on the world. Such an engagement with an artwork can interrupt the patterns of thinking and acting that might have become increasingly thoughtless and ego-centric. It can be a re-creation in the true sense of the word. Paul Tillich, one of the great twentieth century religious philosophers, tells of an experience he had during the First World War where he served as a chaplain in the German army. On a brief leave from the front he visited Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin and stood entranced before Botticelli's "Madonna and Child with Singing Angels." The moment was spiritually transformative, he tells us, lifting his spirits beyond the mud and grime of the battlefield to contemplate life and meaning on a different plane altogether. The experience enabled him to return to duty with renewed inner strength and calm.1 I believe this is a rather powerful and compelling example of what Carr is talking about.In coming to his conclusion, Carr is relying on the particularly difficult case of "music alone," that is, music that does not have words, title, or any other kind of representative function. In other words his argument does not depend on any didactic nature or morally or spiritually directive intent of the music. Rather, it is centered on music that ostensibly is not about anything. This is musical sound composed and performed for the appreciation of what it is in itself. And yet, in providing distance from the every day world, according to Carr, it can give expression to "realms of spiritual experience that lie beyond the sensual and empirical." Here we enter the world of the metaphorical and symbolic, what Rudolf Otto would call the "irrational" or "superrational," or the realm of the Holy. While Carr does not state this explicitly I would go so far as to say that this realm of the wordless and sacred is where the spiritual and the moral are grounded and from where they draw their power.Against this background, I would like to ask how does "music alone," in the sense intended by Carr and Peter Kivy from whom he borrowed the term bring about this effect? We are unable now to ask Tillich what it was that gave the Botticelli its impact for him, but it is curious that what it did for him it most likely did not do for all the other soldiers from the front who happened upon it the way he did. Tillich would most likely explain its effect by resorting to his theory of symbols, because after all this painting does have a literal meaning that might very well have inspired him. But... (shrink)

L'écologie cherche à connaître les conditions d'existence des organismes par rapport à leur milieu physique et biotique.D'une part elle étudie les exigences des organismes envers le milieu et leurs adaptations à celui-ci; d'autre part, elle recherche comment le milieu influe sur les organismes. Or, puisque chaque être vivant fait partie du milieu des autres et que sa présence et son activité modifient le milieu physique et biotique pour lui-même comme pour les autres, l'écologie est amenée à considérer en général les (...) interactions entre les facteurs constitués par les organismes ainsi que par les agents inorganiques.Toutefois, la complexité de ces interactions est telle qu'à leur analyse physico-chimique s'opposent des difficultés partiellement insurmontables. La raison en est que les multiples facteurs écologiques n'agissent pas isolément, mais en combinaison dans l'espace et dans le temps. Il en résulte des états d'équilibre relatif dont seule l'expérience multiséculaire de la nature nous révèle l'aboutissement avec certitude. Aussi bien l'écologiste qui veut en tenir compte commence-t-il ses recherches par le relevé qualitatif et quantitatif des groupements biologiques spontanés. Le chercheur les reconnaît à la constance relative de leur composition, dans les divers endroits où ils sont réalisés, constance résultant de l'équilibre relatif entre les facteurs. C'est exactement pour de tels groupements queMöbius à créé le terme de biocénose. Ainsi la biocénotique peut être considérée comme la propédeutique d'une écologie justement conçue; elle ne serait que préparatoire et provisoire si la Science pouvait un jour entièrement éclaircir le jeu des forces écologiques.Enfin en essayant de bien situer l'écologie dans le cadre des disciplines biologiques voisines, il est utile d'avoir présent à l'esprit l'ébauche suivante d'un nouveau système de la biologie:Dans mes „Analyses et synthèses biocénotiques” , j'ai discuté la conception d'Agrell, qui se base sur des stations-types préétablies. Depuis,Agrell a consacrédeux articles polémiques à soutenir que ses „Bestandestypen” s'identifient aux groupements écologiques tels que je le conçois.Il n'en est rien.Dans l'idée d'Agrell, tous les relevés provenant d'un même type de stations font a priori partie d'un même „Bestandestyp”. La conséquence en est que certaines espèces en réalité vicariantes, c'est-à-dire ne cohabitant jamais -Tetracanthella wahlgreni etFolsomia brevicauda, par exemple — se trouvent réunies, sur le papier, dans une même „communauté”. Au contraire, dans mon système, les relevés faits dans un certain type de stations sont classés tantôt dans un groupement , tantôt dans un autre , d'après leur composition faunistique servant d'indicateur. Cette différence explique amplement les discordances qu'Arell relève entre mes indices d'abondance-fréquence et les siens, discordance prouvant une fois de plus que les „Bestandestypen” et les groupements ne sont pas la même chose.Agrell qualifie de résidu l'un de mes groupements. Or, rien n'est plus résiduel queson Bestandestyp 2, qui représente l'ensemble de 7 stations sur 10, celles qui restent après avoir retranché les 3 stations de milieux extrêmes.Agrell reproche à ma méthode de laisser inclassables certains relevés dépourvusd'espèces vicariantes. Cela n'est-il pas préférable au classement de force de relevés, fragmentaires et aux calculs hasardeux basés sur des unités hétérogènes?Enfin,Agrell estime que le choix des espèces caractéristiques est subjectif. J'ai: montré qu'il ne l'est ni plus ni moins que celui des caractères spécifiques en taxonomie.Oekologie, Ethologie, Biogeographie und Biocoenotik werden noch häufig miteinander verwechselt. Diese Disziplinen lassen sich an Hand des Schemas unterscheiden, das in vorstehenden Schlussfolgerungen wiedergegeben ist. Dieses Schema ist zugleich ein Beitrag zu einem neuen, dreidimensionalen System der Biologie.Speziell wird auf den methodischen Unterschied zwischen Oekologie und Biocoenotik eingegangen. Die Biocoenotik kann als eine unentbehrliche Vorstufe der Oekologie angesehen werden, insofern sie die natürliche Vergemeinschaftung der Organismen als ein grossartiges, von der Natur selbst eingesetztes Experiment betrachtet. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, dass Ergebnis dieses Experiments zu beschreiben. Die Lebensgemeinschaften, die sie dabei unterscheidet, sind gekennzeichnet durch ihre häufig wiederkehrende, einigermassen konstante Zusammensetzung, entsprechend den relativen Faktoren-Gleichgewichten, welche sich im Laufe der Jahrhunderte einstellen. Die Lebensgemeinschaften sind aber viel leichter zu erfassen als die Faktoren-Gleichgewichte und deren biologische Bedeutung. Ihre Abgrenzung erfolgt, — wie in der Taxonomie diejenige der Arten — auf Grund objektiver Diskontinuitäten. Letztere gründen sich in der Biocoenotik auf die sich ökologisch ersetzenden Arten. Sie sind die Prüfsteine für die Grundeinheiten der Biocoenotik: die Biocoenosen.] Soweit die Organismen einer Biocoenose aufeinander einwirken, stellen sie gleichzeitig einen Konnex dar; und soweit sie in ihren Ansprüchen oder Anpassungen übereinstimmen, gehören sie auch zum gleichen Lebensformen-Typ. Es ist praktisch, drei Grössenordnungen von Biocoenosen zu unterscheiden: Synusien, Assoziationen und Biome. (shrink)

This celebratory Festschrift dedicated to Charles Kahn comprises some 23 articles by friends, former students and colleagues, many of whom first presented their papers at the international "Presocratics and Plato" Symposium in his honor. The conference was organized and sponsored by the HYELE Institute for Comparative Studies, Parmenides Publishing, and Starcom AG, with endorsements from the International Plato Society, and the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania. While Kahn's work reaches far beyond the Presocratics and (...) Plato, it is in these subject areas that the distinction of his scholarship has come to be regarded as virtually unrivaled. The articles contributed to this volume are by some of the most renowned scholars working on these topics today, their breadth and depth bearing witness to his profound impact and influence on the discipline of Ancient Greek Philosophy._ Charles Kahn taught Classics and Philosophy at Columbia University from 1957 to 1965, and has since been teaching in the Philosophy Department of the University of Pennsylvania. He spent a year as Visiting Professor at the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, and had additional Visiting Fellowships at Balliol College, Oxford and Clare Hall, Cambridge, and a term as Visiting Professor at Harvard. He is the recipient of several prestigious research grants, from the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. In 2000 he was elected Fellow of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of _Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, The Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and Essays on Being_. His latest book,_Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue_, is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. _ Contributors: Julia Annas Sarah Broadie Lesley Brown Tomás Calvo-Martínez Diskin Clay John M. Dillon Dorothea Frede Arnold Hermann Carl A. Huffman Enrique Hülsz Piccone D. M. Hutchinson Paul Kalligas Vassilis Karasmanis Aryeh Kosman Anthony A. Long Richard McKirahan Susan Sauvé Meyer Alexander P.D.Mourelatos Satoshi Ogihara Richard Patterson Christopher J. Rowe David Sedley Richard Sorabji. (shrink)

The article explores Søren Kierkegaard's interpretation of Abraham's paradoxical obedience (Genesis 22). It does so on the basis of five scenic narrations told by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling, and in his late Journals. Jacques Derrida is found to focus on similar points in his Gift of Death: especially on the suspension of ethics by religion and on the concepts of offering as well as of responsibility. Derrida claims that human responsibility is always tied to what he calls universal offering (...) to a radical other. The article argues that both the late Kierkegaard and Derrida exaggerate the inexplicability of the religious situation, each of them in his own way, and that the distinction between religion, ethics, and human responsibility is to be maintained (against Derrida), together with awe before the incommensurability of the single individual. /// O presente artigo investiga a interpretação kierkegaardiana acerca da paradoxal obediência de Abraão descrita no capítulo 22 do Livro do Génesis. Para a elaboração do respectivo argumento, o artigo baseia-se em cinco elementos narrativos incluídos na obra Temor e Tremor, bem como nos Diários, de Søren Kierkegaard Salienta-se também o facto de Jacques Derrida, na sua obra Donner la mort, insistir nos mesmos pontos atinentes a Kierkegaard, nomeadamente os relativos à suspensão da ética pela religião, bem como nos conceitos de doação e de responsabilidade. Derrida, com efeito, defende que a responsabilidade humana está sempre ligada àquilo que ele considera ser uma doação universal a um outro radical. O artigo considera que tanto o último Kierkegaard como Derrida exageram no que se refere à inexplicabilidade da situação religiosa, cada um deles num modo que lhe é próprio, e afirma que a distinção entre religião, ética e responsabilidade humana deve ser preservada, ao contrário do que diz Derrida, juntamente com a admiração devida diante da incomensurabilidade do indivíduo em sua singularidade. (shrink)

So the philosopher's way to be is the source (Quelle) of his values and of his basic model; it is an important way of understanding thrall. It appears, now, that the thought of this paper could be simplified. The primary notion is the philosopher's "way to be." Style, locus of interest, nisus and way of thought can then be seen as growing out of this, as particular aspects or expressions of it. This entire paper then would be an attempt to (...) come to grips with the primary notion. How is a "way to be" related to what is normally called a philo sopher's views or theories (the formulable core)? Is it not irrelevant as non-implicatory fact, like biographical details or social background? I do not think so. A philosopher's way to be is not external fact to the formulable core of his thought. It is not "internal" either in the logical sense. It is what allows us to comprehend his explicit views. (shrink)

This article seeks to analyze how the phenomenon of dance presents itself in philosophy, especially from the reflections of the German philosopher F. Nietzsche. To enhance our hypotheses, we will resort to the literary work The Steppenwolf by the German writer Hermann Hesse. We know that dance as a metaphor for thought is presented both throughout Nietzsche's work and in the aforementioned book by Hermann Hesse. Therefore, our analysis seeks to demonstrate how dance involves a situation of surrender (...) and acceptance of Life. It is about dance as a thought of overcoming oneself. This overcoming takes place in the instant. The instant when we understand Life as a movement towards its infinite possibilities. Based on the philosophical investigation, in this work, we will start by presenting the concept of dance in Nietzsche's philosophy, then we will exemplify this concept in the work of Hesse and, finally, we will demonstrate the relationship between dance, thought and affirmation of life. (shrink)

A. A. Fet’s translation of J. W. Goethe’s Hermann und Dorothea is an important early example of Fet’s lifelong practice as a translator and attests to his well-known fidelity to his source texts. His strongest preference is to maintain the versification characteristics of his source, but the degree of his lexical-semantic fidelity is also very strong and far outranks fidelity on other levels (phonetic, grammatical). The poet evidently translated holistically within very small textual domains, within which he sometimes isolated (...) pivots of core semantic information (which he located in translation as they were in the original), around which less important material was fitted, insofar as space permitted. In Fet’s text, versification limitations sometimes led to lexical-semantic mismatches of semanticdenotation, and these mismatches are characterized in the paper: they typically involve repetitions, repeated mentions, or known information, and the mismatch may entail full or partial loss or enrichment of the semantics of the original. In addition, conflicts sometimes arise between denotative requirements within the local domain and the cumulative (usually connotative) associations generated across the larger domain of the whole text. When such conflicts arise, Fet resolves them in favour of small-domain accuracy, resulting in semantic changes (‘shifts’) in the domain of the poetic text, which thereby loses some rhetorical or poetic force, relative to the original. Dissonance between large- and smalldomain semantics is often inevitable, because of the language-specific nature of connotation. To the extent that the semantics of Fet’s translation are a consequence of his personal preferences, they may be viewed in the context of, first, his early school training (not far behind him when he translated Hermann und Dorothea) and, second, his status as both professional poet, writing in Russian, and educated native German-Russian bilingual. (shrink)

Hermann Lotze was a key figure in the philosophy of the second half of the 19th century, influencing practically all leading philosophical schools of the late 19th and the early 20th century: (i) the neo-Kantians; (ii) Brentano and his school of descriptive psychology; (iii) the British idealists; (iv) Husserl’s phenomenology; (v) Dilthey’s philosophy of life; (vi) Frege’s new logic; (vii) the early Cambridge analytic philosophy; (viii) William James’s pragmatism. The book first presents the main ideas of Hermann Lotze’s (...) philosophy (Part I), and then traces his influence on the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf (Part 2) and Cambridge analytic philosophy (Part 3). In addition, the book includes Bertrand Russell’s conspectus of J. E. McTaggart’s 1898 lectures on Lotze. (shrink)

In his book, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, Mr. Spier demonstrated his ability to give a compact exposition of the philosophy of Hermann Dooyeweerd. And now within comparatively few pages, Mr. Spier ex-posits and criticizes Existentialism, a movement noted for its obscurity and verbosity. Mr. Spier's work is of an introductory nature and does not intend to give an exhaustive account. The merit of his clear exposition and criticism is for the reader to judge. -Translator's Preface.

ArgumentThis paper aims at contributing to the ongoing efforts to get a firmer grasp of the systematic significance of the entanglement of idealism and empiricism in Helmholtz's work. Contrary to existing analyses, however, the focal point of the present exposition is Helmholtz's attempt to articulate a psychological account of objectification. Helmholtz's motive, as well as his solution to the problem of the object are outlined, and interpreted against the background of his scientific practice on the one hand, and that of (...) empiricist and (transcendental) idealist analyses of experience on the other. The specifically psychological angle taken, not only prompts us to consider figures who have hitherto been treated as having only minor import for Helmholtz interpretation (most importantly J.S. Mill and J.G. Fichte), it furthermore sheds new light on some central tenets of the latter's psychological stance that have hitherto remained underappreciated. For one thing, this analysis reveals an explicit voluntarist tendency in Helmholtz's psychological theory. In conclusion, it is argued that the systematic significance of Helmholtz's empirico-transcendentalism with respect to questions of the mind is best understood as an attempt to found his empirical theory of perception in a second order, normative account of epistemic subjectivity. (shrink)

Scholars have long been captivated by the parallels between birdsong and human speech and language. In this book, leading scholars draw on the latest research to explore what birdsong can tell us about the biology of human speech and language and the consequences for evolutionary biology. They examine the cognitive and neural similarities between birdsong learning and speech and language acquisition, considering vocal imitation, auditory learning, an early vocalization phase, the structural properties of birdsong and human language, and the striking (...) similarities between the neural organization of learning and vocal production in birdsong and human speech. After outlining the basic issues involved in the study of both language and evolution, the contributors compare birdsong and language in terms of acquisition, recursion, and core structural properties, and then examine the neurobiology of song and speech, genomic factors, and the emergence and evolution of language. Contributors: Hermann Ackermann, Gabriël J.L. Beckers, Robert C. Berwick, Johan J. Bolhuis, Noam Chomsky, Frank Eisner, Martin Everaert, Michale S. Fee, Olga Fehér, Simon E. Fisher, W. Tecumseh Fitch, Jonathan B. Fritz, Sharon M.H. Gobes, Riny Huijbregts, Eric Jarvis, Robert Lachlan, Ann Law, Michael A. Long, Gary F. Marcus, Carolyn McGettigan, Daniel Mietchen, Richard Mooney, Sanne Moorman, Kazuo Okanoya, Christophe Pallier, Irene M. Pepperberg, Jonathan F. Prather, Franck Ramus, Eric Reuland, Constance Scharff, Sophie K. Scott, Neil Smith, Ofer Tchernichovski, Carel ten Cate, Christopher K. Thompson, Frank Wijnen, Moira Yip, Wolfram Ziegler, Willem Zuidema. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism and the Technologies of Discernment in Pietist PedagogyKelly J. WhitmerWhile the Franckesche Stiftungen (the Francke Foundations) of Halle/Saale are perhaps best known today as the institutional centre of German Pietism, throughout much of the eighteenth century they were widely regarded as a pedagogically innovative Schulstadt (or city of schools). The founder of this Schulstadt, August Hermann Francke (1663–1727), was many things to many people: Pietist, radical Lutheran, (...) theologian, pedagogue, professor of Greek and Oriental languages, preacher, member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and proponent of a Protestant mission. Like most participants in what was initially a grassroots movement oriented around the personality of Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), a minister active in Frankfurt am Main around 1670 who sought to breathe new life into the Lutheran church,2 Francke rarely referred to himself as a Pietist. From his post at the University of Halle (founded in 1694), this Spenerian prote´gé set out to create a new "universal seminar" that would make the assimilation of many diverse points of view, identities, and competing strands of knowledge its [End Page 545] defining mandate. "My purpose," Francke wrote in a letter to a Pastor Ring from Grünebartau (October 29, 1712), "is to develop a universal institution, useful for bringing into a good and holy order all that is important for the Christianity of all orders of society and relates, in some way, to the healing power of the soul."3 His Schulstadt would "bring into order" a myriad of relationships around a single point and relied, quite deliberately I propose, on an eclectic methodology to do this.In recent years, the relationship of Francke's Schulstadt to the implementation of Brandenburg-Prussia's first compulsory schooling system and teacher training institutes has been better documented than in the past.4 Scholars of education have paid closer attention to the methodological innovations of Pietist pedagogy, and its points of convergence with the ideas of John Locke (1632–1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827) have become subjects of mounting interest.5 Francke's significance for the history of education has been assessed mainly in terms of his ability to realize the pedagogically inclined reform projects of seventeenth-century figures, such as Johann Amos Comenius (1592–1670).6 We know that the thousands of children who participated in the life of the Schulstadt very often left Halle to become actively involved as teachers and ministers throughout the German states. Several played pivotal roles in the development of the late eighteenth-century educational reform movement known as Philanthropismus and its associated practices and institutions.7 [End Page 546]Perhaps the most striking feature of Francke's Schulstadt was its curriculum, which featured innovative training regimens in applied mathematics for children from diverse social backgrounds.8 The scale and rigor of these programs were to be found nowhere else at the time and can be linked to the overtly pedagogical mandate of the Berlin Academy of Sciences (f. 1701). These regimens deliberately juxtaposed artisanal and learned knowledge and stressed the importance of the eye as a conciliatory medium.9 Despite having acquired largely anti-empiricist reputations over the years due to their lingering interest in alchemy and their roles in securing the banishment of the "rationalist" mathematician and philosopher, Christian Wolff (1679–1754), from their community in 1723, careful consideration of what Halle Pietists were teaching in their schools suggests a different view. These historical actors reconciled categories of knowledge production and transmission often framed as oppositional—despite what several scholars have recently shown to be their clear interconnectedness.10I argue here for the predominance of eclecticism in the Schulstadt, including a pronounced emphasis on the "middling" mathematical and mechanical sciences as tools of conciliation and self-improvement. I seek to illustrate how eclecticism was much more than a Philosophiebegriff that was well received by some Pietists, as Walter Sparn has argued, but that it is better understood as a set of conciliatory practices, traces of which resonate in Pietist lesson plans.11 Teachers in Francke's schools integrated experimental philosophy into an educational program that was introducing children to the exercises of... (shrink)

This volume, which contains the 1962 lecture "Zeit und Sein," is the most important publication by Heidegger since Unterwegs zur Sprache appeared in 1959. Bearing the same title as the much discussed missing part of the first half of Sein und Zeit, "Zeit und Sein" is the best demonstration we have of how the later Heidegger carries out the program which was outlined in Sein und Zeit, i.e., how the clue which the analytic of Dasein provides--that Being is to be (...) understood in terms of time--is followed out in the later works. Heidegger explicates the temporality of Being in terms of its character as a "gift" and an epochal sending which "is" both as having been and as to come. Being as time is thus the "event of appropriation". In addition to "Zeit und Sein," Zur Sache des Denkens also contains: The notes of a seminar which Heidegger conducted at Todtnauberg in 1962 upon the "Zeit und Sein" lecture. As Professor Alfredo Guzzoni, the editor of these notes, indicates this is the only time that Heidegger has conducted a seminar on a text of his own composition. A lecture entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Problem of Thought," which was delivered at a Kierkegaard colloquium in 1964. An autobiographical description of Heidegger's growing interest in and attraction to Husserl's phenomenological method in the pre-Sein und Zeit period; this was prepared in 1963 for a Festschrift in honor of Hermann Niemeyer.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This paper describes an episode in the life of the prominent plant radiation geneticist, Lewis J. Stadler during which he became a target of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning loyalty to the United States due to possible associations with the communist party. The research is based on considerable private correspondence of Dr. Stadler, the FBI interrogatory questions and Dr. Stadler’s answers and letters of support for Dr. Stadler by leading scientists such as, Hermann J. Muller.

The Philosophy of Hermann Cohen: An Attempt to SystematizeThe article adressess the problem of evolution of Hermann Cohen’s thinking. In the first part, the evolution is shown in the historical-problematic context and the main idea is to show the basic concepts organizing the author’s most important books. Part two is an attempt to capture the motives of his understanding of philosophy and the central concept is the logic of validity Geltungslogik. As a result it is shown that throughout (...) his whole life Cohen struggled with the problem of such an understanding of philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 126-127 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment T. J. Hochstrasser. Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 246. Cloth, $54.95. In a worthy addition to Cambridge's Ideas in Context series, T. J. Hochstrasser undertakes an excavation. His aim is to provide a description, and to (...) demonstrate the importance within the German Frühaufklärung, of a largely forgotten philosophical approach: eclecticism. Hochstrasser argues that the triumph of Wolffian rationalism in the Protestant universities in the middle of the eighteenth century occluded the importance of eclecticism for Kant, who in turn occluded it for everyone afterward. But the price of forgetting eclecticism is high. Not only are we left with no account--or a skewed account--of the development of German thought from the first stirrings of the Enlightenment to the emergence of the Critical philosophy, but our understanding of the development of the historiography of philosophy is badly compromised. For among their many accomplishments--in natural jurisprudence, in university reform--the eclectics were the first critical historians of philosophy, their distinctive genres being historically aware treatises on natural law and Whig histories of natural jurisprudence. Hochstrasser's study traces the development of eclecticism, from the work of its founders, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, through a devolution in the hands of Thomasius's later disciples, to the eventual oblivion in the middle of the eighteenth century. This review will focus on the beginning of this narrative, as Pufendorf is the leading figure in the book.Eclecticism began with Pufendorf's attempt, in his mature work on natural law, to reconcile his conflicting inheritances from Grotius and Hobbes without simply endorsing the work of either. He was impressed both by Grotius's explanation of the law of nations in terms of human sociability--but also by Hobbes's criticisms of Grotius, rooted in the latter's analysis of the state of nature. At the same time, he wished to reject Grotius's method of induction from sociological observation and Hobbes's minimally constrained voluntarism. Contributing further to his perplexity was his increasing disaffection from the geometric approach he had adopted in his Elementa Jurisprudentiae Universalis.The way out of this impasse, Hochstrasser contends, was revealed to Pufendorf in correspondence with Hermann Conring, the leading constitutional lawyer of his time, and Johann Böcler, Grotius's most erudite commentator. Böcler chastised Pufendorf for his neglect of history, and both of Pufendorf's correspondents pointed out his need for some non-Hobbesian criterion by which he could validate his first principles, whatever they turned out to be. Stung particularly by Böcler's remarks, Pufendorf returned to the Stoics and there discovered a via media between Hobbes's pessimism and Grotius's optimism: a synthesis anticipating Kant's doctrine of "unsocial sociability." For the purposes of Hochstrasser's study, the key aspects of Pufendorf's solution are these: first, it avoids mere voluntarism; second, it does this by means of a moral epistemology that sharply distinguishes natural law [End Page 126] from moral theology; finally, the validating criterion for Pufendorf's first principles is located in critical appropriation of the history of moral philosophy. These were to be hallmarks of Pufendorf's school.On the first and second points, Hochstrasser seems to me substantively correct, though I think he misunderstands the nature of Pufendorf's escape from mere voluntarism and thereby underplays the religious dimensions of Pufendorf's theory. Among recent Anglo-American commentators on Pufendorf, only Robert Adams has in my view properly construed Pufendorf's thought: that it involves a command theory of obligation proper, but posits the natural advantageousness of some hierarchies as a buttress against mere voluntarism. Hochstrasser is thus right to insist, against Leibniz, that Pufendorf's account of obligation is coherent. But he is wrong to suggest that "there was nothing in Pufendorf's theory... to oblige him to introduce fear of punishment by a superior... " (105). He is... (shrink)

In 1887 Helmholtz discussed the foundations of measurement in science as a last contribution to his philosophy of knowledge. This essay borrowed from earlier debates on the foundations of mathematics, on the possibility of quantitative psychology, and on the meaning of temperature measurement. Late nineteenth-century scrutinisers of the foundations of mathematics made little of Helmholtz’s essay. Yet it inspired two mathematicians with an eye on physics, and a few philosopher-physicists. The aim of the present paper is to situate Helmholtz’s contribution (...) in this complex array of nineteenth-century philosophies of number, quantity, and measurement.Author Keywords: Helmholtz; Measurement; Arithmetic; P. Du Bois-Reymond; H. and R. Grassmann; J. von Kries. (shrink)

The aim of this lucid translation from the Latin text of the Leonine edition of St Thomas’s commentary upon Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias is to situate the traditional formal logic in relation to modern logic. The old logic of terms is still of importance, as illustrated by Hermann Weyl.

I. Introduction Siris, Berkeley's last major work, is undeniably a rather odd book. It could hardly be otherwise, given Berkeley's aims in writing it, which are three-fold: 'to communicate to the public the salutary virtues of tar-water,'1 to provide scientific background supporting the efficacy of tar-water as a medicine, and to lead the mind of the reader, via gradual steps, toward contemplation of God.2 The latter two aims shape Berkeley's extensive use of contemporary natural science in Siris. In particular, Berkeley's (...) focus on what he calls fire (or aether or light) as a quasiuniversal 'cause' of natural change3 serves these purposes, for the 'activity' of the aether, in his view, can both explain the miraculous virtues of a certain medicine, i.e. tar-water, and reveal God's action and his divine order.4 Berkeley's corpuscular speculations, including his use of fire-theory, are not especially idiosyncratic as natural philosophy. In his theorizing, as Jessop and other have noted, he is heavily indebted to the work of Hermann Boerhaave, the Dutch chemist, botanist, and physician whose teachings were highly influential in mid-eighteenth century Britain.5 Boerhaave, along with other Dutch natural philosophers cited by Berkeley, assigned a central role in accounting for physio-chemical activity to fire, a subtle, insensible particulate substance, sometimes identified with light. (shrink)

The great mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, Hermann Weyl, once called mathematics the “science of the infinite.” This is a fitting title: contemporary mathematics—especially Cantorian set theory—provides us with marvelous ways of taming and clarifying the infinite. Nonetheless, I believe that the epistemic significance of mathematical infinity remains poorly understood. This dissertation investigates the role of the infinite in three diverse areas of study: number theory, cosmology, and probability theory. A discovery that emerges from my work is that the epistemic (...) role of the infinite varies, often in surprising ways, across different domains of knowledge. -/- My first chapter examines the role of mathematical infinity in number theory. It is reasonable to think that theorems concerning finite patterns and structures in the natural numbers are particularly “simple” or “elementary.” Indeed, such statements are comprehensible to a wide range of investigators, regardless of their mathematical training. One might then expect proofs of these theorems to be similarly comprehensible. However, many proofs, especially those that utilize only finitary methods, are exceedingly difficult to understand. Consequently, one finds that finitary theorems are often re-proved using infinitary techniques. My claim is that this is because infinitary proofs are often explanatory, while finitary proofs are not. This chapter analyzes why this is the case. Along the way, I investigate other questions of long-standing interest in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g., the role of purity/impurity ascriptions and the nature of the content of a theorem. In particular, I diagnose the explanatory potential of the infinite by articulating a new construal of content. This new construal both saves intuitive epistemic ascriptions made in mathematical practice and explains the unexpected role of the infinite in providing explanatory proofs of finitary statements. Thus, in number theory, my claim is that the infinite often plays an explanatory role. -/- My second chapter turns to the role of the infinite in cosmology. It investigates a question much discussed by philosophers and physicists alike: is the spatial extent of the universe finite or infinite? Contemporary cosmological research has indicated that one of the essential determinants of the extent of the universe is the topology we ascribe to space. Topology is a global property, which may suggest that it is not testable through local observation. Nonetheless, some cosmologists have indicated that it may be empirically detected, thereby providing an answer to the question of spatial extent. I argue that, in fact, the epistemic status of the topology of space is extremely subtle and not well captured by any of the categories commonly employed by philosophers of science. In particular, I argue that topological properties are neither empirical nor a priori (even in suitably weakened senses). Furthermore, I claim that we should prefer topological properties that generate finite universe models (consistent with our best data) in order to avoid extremely thorny issues concerning the physics of an infinite universe. I argue for such a preference on the grounds of the simplicity and explanatory power of finite universe models. Thus, in cosmology, my claim is that the finite often plays an explanatory and simplifying role. -/- My third chapter investigates several paradoxes that arise in the foundations of infinitary probability theory: the Label Invariance Paradox, God’s Lottery, and Bertrand’s Paradox. I argue that these have been poorly understood because they do not expressly concern probability theory, but rather our intuitions about—and formal techniques for dealing with— infinite sets. The paradoxes in question are, in fact, symptoms of our complete reliance upon Cantorian cardinality and its associated criterion of sameness of “size.” That is, two sets have the same cardinality if and only if the elements of the sets can be placed in 1-1 correspondence. When applied to infinite sets, this criterion produces counterintuitive verdicts. For instance, given a fair lottery on the natural numbers, we expect that the probability of drawing an even number is 1/2, and likewise for drawing an odd number. However, one can construct “relabellings” of the naturals such that the probability of drawing an even number remains 1/2, while the probability for drawing an odd number becomes 1/4. I argue that, ultimately, it is the coarseness of Cantorian cardinality that generates the probabilistic paradoxes. I then propose that finer-grained measures of infinite sets from mathematical logic and number theory can help to dissolve the paradoxes in question. Thus, in probability theory, we find that particular kinds of infinitary techniques effectively systematize our theory, while others lead to paradox. (shrink)

The paper explores Hermann Weyl’s turn to intuitionism through a philosophical prism of normative framework transitions. It focuses on three central themes that occupied Weyl’s thought: the notion of the continuum, logical existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism to adequately address the foundational crisis of mathematics. The analysis of these themes reveals Weyl’s continuous endeavor to deal with such fundamental problems and suggests a view that provides a different perspective concerning Weyl’s wavering foundational positions. Building on (...) a philosophical model of scientific framework transitions and the special role that normative indecision or ambivalence plays in the process, the paper examines Weyl’s motives for considering such a radical shift in the first place. It concludes by showing that Weyl’s shifting stances should be regarded as symptoms of a deep, convoluted intrapersonal process of self-deliberation induced by exposure to external criticism. (shrink)

Constructive (productive) thinking in the critical philosophy of Hermann Cohen differs significantly from the seemingly similar speculative thinking in J. G. Fichte’s Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) (1794/95). The fundamental characteristics of scientific thinking in Cohen’s teaching include: purity, focus on the “fact of science”, the origin (Ursprung), the infinitesimal method, continuity, movement, production, correlation, intensive magnitude, interrelation of thinking and being. According to Cohen, scientific thinking can only be pure and generated by the origin. The origin is continuous action (...) (movement) of thinking to separate the united and bind the divided content. In this process, thinking and being are correlative. Infinitely small reality contains thinking and being simultaneously as a union and in a divided form. The infinitesimal method is thinking that continuously carries out a) the operations of opposing itself as pure thinking to the results of its own production; b) the coincidence of itself with the products of its own generation. Infinitesimal thinking seeks to eliminate the difference between self and being. Nevertheless, being constantly retains autonomy. Being does not merge with thinking and is not absorbed by it. In Fichte’s Science of Knowledge pure thinking moves in a logical circle, having no access into real being. In an effort to break out of this circle and find its causality, thinking turns not to the being of the world of phenomena, but to the Absolute I. Such a speculative approach to consciousness, thinking and being has little in common with Cohen’s critical position. (shrink)

This article attempts a contextual study of the origin and early development of August Kekulé's theory of aromatic compounds. The terminus a quo is essentially August Hofmann's coining of the modern chemical denotation of ‘aromatic’ in 1855; the terminus ad quem is the first full codification of Kekulé's theory in the sixth fascicle of his Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie, published in the summer of 1866. Kekulé's theory is viewed in context with the earlier and concurrent experimental work of such chemists (...) as Hermann Kolbe, Friedrich Beilstein, Rudolph Fittig, and Hugo Müller. The reception of the theory is briefly examined. Attention is paid to the role of Kekulé's molecular models and of his celebrated dream anecdote of the snake that seizes its own tail. The episode is used as a case study for the continuity of scientific progress, and to illustrate the close reciprocal interactions of hypothesis and experiment in the evolution of a scientific theory. (shrink)

Situating Lotze in the School of Speculative Theology, I use debates about Schelling’s critique of Hegel—then and now—to understand Lotze’s critique of Hegel. Lotze’s early metaphysics seems to employ a version of Hegel’s dialectical analysis of being, phenomena, and mind emphasizing “the interconnection of things.” One can equally argue that he proceeds in an analytic style of reviewing and testing alternative theories. My tentative conclusion is that he assumes the existence of reality (the Absolute) like Schelling, and makes cognition a (...) process subordinate to that reality. In this respect, he goes beyond his Kantian mentors J. F. Fries and E. F. Apelt. From all these sources came a radically original Gestalt metaphysics. For example, he reverses Kant’s forms of intuition (Anschauung) into “forms of intuitability”(Anschaulichkeit), including the relational categories of space, time, motion, mechanism, organism, law, and event. He then makes the categories into ethical levels of a “teleological idealism.” In this way he overcomes his Herbartian teachers’ separation of metaphysics from ethics, evincing his center Hegelian roots. (shrink)

Dyzenhaus' work can best be described as advocacy scholarship. Both the spirit and content of this book reflect its author's passionate commitment and argumentative approach. It is part scholarly analysis and part political prescription, synthesized in such a way that occasionally it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. Dyzenhaus embraces Gramsci's position that “philosophies of law and politics are . . . elaborations and justification of packages of political commitments” (p. 5). He also adopts the “integrative jurisprudence” of (...) Harold J. Berman that connects “politics, morality and history” by having his “arguments move between exposition of the particular…. (shrink)